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This paper empirically examines the relationship between
conservatism and earnings management in chemical and allied
products manufacturers via an analysis of the allowance for
doubtful accounts and bad debt expense. Data used in the study
included total accounts receivable, the total allowance for
uncollectible accounts, total assets, and other firm-level data
from the COMPUSTAT database of North American firms for
companies with the standardized industry code (SIC) of 28 which
represents chemical and allied products manufacturers.
Chemical and allied products manufacturers were deemed
an ideal target for the study because the industry typically has
large balances in accounts receivable and allowance for doubtful
accounts. Bad debt expense and write-offs were also used; these
were obtained from the firms’ forms 10K Schedule II filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the study
period from 2005-2017. Analysts reports were also used, as
obtained from Bloomberg for each firm. Results from subsequent
regression analyses indicate that firms utilized excessive
conservatism within the allowance for doubtful accounts to
manage earnings to achieve earnings goals throughout the study
period.
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and Wilson (1988) modeled bad debt expense based
on economic determinants that explain significant
portions of bad debt expense. Others found that
firms manage earnings using receivables (Teoh,
Wong, & Rao, 1998; Marquardt & Wiedmand, 2004;
Caylor, 2010). Jackson and Liu (2010) performed
extensive research on the allowance for doubtful
accounts through 2004. However, no research has

1. INTRODUCTION
This research investigates earnings management for
firms that are poorly performing or close to meeting
or beating analysts’ projections. Few have
researched the allowance for doubtful accounts even
though accounts receivable is a material balance
sheet account for numerous companies. McNichols
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been conducted since. Also, their research did not
consider the allowance for doubtful accounts as
a percentage of the accounts receivable balance.
Prior research has considered the reasonableness
of bad debt expense as a percentage of sales but did
not consider the reasonableness of the allowance for
doubtful accounts as a percentage of outstanding
receivables (Jackson & Liu, 2010). Given that firms
estimate bad debts using one of two methods and
both the balance sheet and income statement are
impacted, this research will add to the body of
knowledge by investigating both the income
statement impact and the balance sheet impact.
Our general research question is, “Do firms
utilize the allowance for doubtful accounts to manage
earnings?”. The question is split into three categories:
poorly performing firms, firms close to meeting
analysts’ projections, and firms close to exceeding
analysts’ projections. In addition, we had quality
audit firms as a potential mitigating factor to firms
managing their earnings.
We
study
the
chemical
and
allied
manufacturing industry for several reasons. First,
the industry is relatively large and is often followed
by numerous analysts and investors. Next,
the industry typically has large balances in accounts
receivable and allowance for doubtful accounts.
In addition, several firms within the industry are
geographically located close to the authors, so they
are of interest. Finally, one large industry group
allowed for the timely completion of the study.
The present research begins with a review of
relevant literature, followed by the hypotheses
developed for the study in Section 2, and,
subsequently the methodology in Section 3. Next
reported are the study results in Section 4, as well as
the conclusion in Section 5. The final section of
the research presents the limitations of the study
as well as some opportunities for future related
research.

2. LITERATURE
DEVELOPMENT

REVIEW

AND

is less timely but more persistent (Basu, 1997).
Research
has
indicated
that
conservatism
understates accounting values of equity compared
to fair values of equity. That is, assets and revenues
are understated, and liabilities and expenses are
overstated (Ruch & Taylor, 2015; Bryan, McKnight, &
Houmes, 2021).
The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) includes predictive and confirmatory values
as relevant characteristics of financial information in
the Financial Accounting Concepts (FASB, 2010).
Predictive value means that a decision-maker
can use the information to help forecast future
outcomes (Gordon, Raedy, & Sannela, 2016).
One element of accruals that investors will look
toward is cash flows. Cash flows are often lagged
by one or more periods from resulting accruals
(Houmes & Skantz, 2010). In the case of applying
conservatism, the bad news is recorded before the
resulting decrease in cash flows or expenditure
(Byzalov & Basu, 2016).
Confirmatory
value
means
information
provides feedback to allow a decision-maker to
evaluate prior predictions (Gordon et al., 2016).
The extent to which accounting information has
predictive and confirmatory value to investors
is known as value relevance. Balachandran and
Monhanram (2011) observe that the utilization of
conditional and unconditional conservatism has
increased. They note a general trend of declining
value relevance during the same period. However,
they find no evidence of a decline in value relevance
of accounting information in firms that also had
increased conservatism.
Linking these two concepts of predictive value
and confirmatory value, when investors can
accurately identify earnings persistence using
accounting information, accounting information is
more relevant. However, conditional conservatism
can reduce earnings persistence and predictive value
and increase earnings volatility (Dichev & Tang,
2008; Chen, Folsom, Perek, & Sami, 2014). Dichev
and Tang (2008) reported in a study covering
40 years that conditional conservatism increased
volatility and reduced persistence confirming
an earlier study by Givoly and Hayn (2000).
Chen et al. (2014) add that conditional conservatism
resulted in not only reduced earnings persistence
but also lower pricing multiples for firms. Others
find that while earnings are less persistent or more
difficult to predict when conditional conservatism
is present, the ability for analysts to predict future
cash flows increases (Kim & Kross, 2005;
Bandyopadhyay, Chen, Huang, & Jha, 2010). These
studies confirm that conditional conservatism,
which is conservatism applied due to an event
occurring, reduces persistence.
Unconditional conservatism may or may not
have a similar impact on earnings persistence,
depending on the nature of the unconditional
accounting practice employed. Applying accelerated
depreciation could cause earnings persistence to
decline due to expensing more depreciation early in
an asset’s life and less later (Bryan et al., 2021).
However, it could increase persistence by having
lower repairs and maintenance expenses early on
when depreciation is higher and then higher repairs
and maintenance expenses later in an asset’s
life when depreciation is lower. Penman and

HYPOTHESES

Unconditional conservatism is based on information
known at the beginning of an asset’s life while
conditional conservatism is based on information
obtained
in
future
periods
(Basu, 2005).
Unconditional conservatism, as the name suggests,
does not occur after a specific economic event.
Rather, unconditional conservatism is an accounting
principle being applied consistently and regularly
(Ruch & Taylor, 2015).
Conditional
conservatism happens when
an event triggers significant negative news to be
recognized in financial statements; however, similar
significant positive news does not trigger
recognition in the financial statements. Information
leading to the belief that fixed assets are impaired
would result in a loss being recorded; however,
information leading to the belief that fixed assets
have significantly appreciated would not result in
a gain being recorded (Financial Accounting
Foundation, 2017a).
Earnings that repeat over time are persistent.
Applying
conservatism,
however,
results in
an asymmetry in the timeliness of information and
persistence of earnings. Further, the bad news is
timelier, yet less persistent, while the good news
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Zhang (2002) found expenditures related to research
and development and advertising reduce earnings
persistence to the extent firms had temporary
fluctuations in these expenditures.
While persistence, predictive value and
confirmatory value are desirable characteristics of
quality accounting information, earnings management
in the name of conservatism is objectionable.
Earnings management represents management’s
intentional manipulation of accounting information
to achieve targeted earning (Schipper, 1989; Habib &
Hansen, 2008; Ruch & Taylor, 2015). The financial
statements submitted by management do not reflect
the actual economic transactions that have occurred
during the period. The FASB in the now superseded
SFAC No. 2 recognized the potential of utilizing
conservatism to understate income in a current
period and then overstate in another period.
In the concept statement, they specifically state
conservatism should not be utilized to rationalize
understatement of earnings (FASB, 1980). Prior
research identifies earnings thresholds that could
trigger management’s manipulation of earnings:
no earnings surprise (meeting analysts’ forecasts),
positive earnings (exceeding analysts’ forecasts), and
earnings increase (initial earning below analysts’
forecasts) (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge,
Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999). Francis, Hasan, and
Wu (2013) find that earnings manipulation increased
among firms during and immediately following
the financial crisis.
Firms utilize earnings management because
the market reacts negatively to missing analysists’
forecasts (Lopez & Rees, 2002). However, stock
returns are significantly higher for those companies
that report earnings that meet or exceed analysts’
forecasts (Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn, 2002; Kasznic &
McNichols, 2002). Studies find that firms seek to
achieve no earnings surprise by both guiding analysts’
forecasts lower and manipulate earnings higher
(Matsumoto, 2002; Burgstahler & Eames, 2006).
Executives utilize active earnings management
through conservatism in three basic forms: 1) big
bath charge where bad news is intentionally made
worse, 2) inappropriate valuation of or expensing
acquisitions, and 3) miscellaneous “cookie jar
reserves” (Watts, 2003b). Managers justify their
overstating liabilities by stating it is conservatism;
however, occasionally, asset write-downs or increased
liabilities are performed so managers may inflate
earnings in the future (Watts, 2003b). Levitt (1998)
concludes that companies intentionally create
reserves, understate their assets, or overstate their
liabilities during good times and then reverse
the adjustments to intentionally overstate income.
Bryan et al. (2021) find that firms have increasingly
understated their accounts receivable balances.
Degeorge et al. (1999) observe that bad news
write-downs associated with conditional conservatism
may be excessive and refer to this as big bath
theory. The term “big bath” is used to describe
an accounting methodology whereby a firm overstates
losses in a period of poor economic status (Kwon &
Lee, 2016). The effect of a big bath is current profits
during the bad time are reduced more than
the actual economic events allowing for future
profits to be higher through reversals or lower than
actual expenses (Lee, Chun, Park, & Choi, 2009; Kim,
Kim, & Kwan, 2012). Stein and Wang (2016) find that

firms facing high levels of negative uncertainty
report more negative accruals and opportunistically
manage earnings downward. They conclude that
investors are likely to attribute the poor
performance to the economic conditions rather than
the firm performance. Their findings continue by
showing firms managed earnings upward during
more certain times because investors expected
persistent earnings during better times (Stein &
Wang, 2016).
Many studies suggest that management uses
conservatism as a methodology to manage a firm’s
earnings (Devine, 1963; FASB, 1980; Levitt, 1998;
Penman & Zhang, 2002; Jackson & Liu, 2010; Ghyasi,
2017). Most studies have focused on estimates
related to bad debts, estimated percentage complete,
and other areas where a year-by-year comparison of
estimated and actual can be made. Penman and
Zhang (2002) report that the application of
unconditional conservatism can create hidden
reserves that can be released into income that
distorts reported performance. Jackson and Liu’s
(2010) research in conservatism studied conservatism
and earnings management. “Accounting slack”, or
hidden reserves as noted above, is created when
unconditional conservatism is applied (Jackson &
Lui, 2010). Bad economic news losses can be
mitigated by this accounting slack. Jackson and
Liu (2010) concluded that companies manage
earnings through the allowance for bad debts.
They investigated temporal changes in the allowance
for doubtful accounts, whether bad debt expense
appears to be managed, and if the conservative
accounting is related to earnings management.
However, they did not consider the possibility of
firms utilizing consistent allowance for doubtful
accounts as a percentage of accounts receivable.
Jackson and Liu (2010) were the first to assess
conservatism on an individual accrual account,
the allowance for doubtful accounts. In their study
of firms from 1980 through 2004, they developed two
measures of conservatism related to the allowance for
doubtful accounts (Jackson & Liu, 2010):

𝐶𝑂𝑁1𝑖𝑡 =

𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝑂𝑖𝑡+1

𝐶𝑂𝑁2𝑖𝑡 = (𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝑂𝑖𝑡+1 )/𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡

(1)
(2)

ALLOWit is the allowance for doubtful accounts.
WOit+1 is write-offs of uncollectible accounts.
SALEit is net sales; i and t are subscripts
representing firm and year, respectively.
CON1it measures the conservative nature of
the allowance for doubtful accounts by creating
a ratio of the allowance for doubtful accounts for
one year divided by the write-offs by the firm in
the next year. If the firm has perfect information,
the ratio will approximate one. If the allowance
account is conservative the ratio will be greater than
one. Their study finds that between 1980 and 2004,
CON1 averaged 2.54 for their sample of over 10,000
firm years (Jackson & Liu, 2010). Bryan et al. (2021)
find that 92.9 percent of firms in their study have
a CON1 of greater than one. In addition, they find
the level of understatement of accounts receivable
has increased since Jackson and Liu’s (2010) study
to 3.81 or almost four years of write-offs in
the allowance for doubtful accounts.
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CON2it measures essentially the same thing as
CON1it, but here they utilize the difference between
the allowance and the next year’s write-offs divided
by sales. Again, if the firm has perfect information,
the difference between the allowance and next year’s
write-offs would be zero, so CON2it would be zero.
Jackson and Liu (2010) find the ratio averaged
0.0027 for firms from 1980 to 2004. Their measures
only consider the allowance as it relates to the income
statement rather than also reviewing the balance
sheet impact. Bryan et al. (2021) find 58.23 percent
of firms have CON2 greater than zero. In addition,
they find firms have been increasingly understating
accounts receivable by reviewing both ALLOWit/WOit+1
and BDEit − WOit+1 from 2005 through 2017
(Bryan et al., 2021).
Previous studies did not address the possibility
of a “big bath”. Kwon and Lee (2016) found that
banks will use big baths in poor economic times to
allow for reversal later (Lee et al., 2009; Kim et al.,
2012). We assert that when a firm’s losses are
so severe that their recognition is unavoidable,
managers eschew upward earnings management and
overstate bad debt expense and corresponding
provisions under the allowance account. Therefore,
hypothesis one is as follows:
H1a: Chemical and allied products manufacturers
with severe losses or are substantially underperforming
will report higher bad debt expense.
Research has linked large audit firms and
internal control quality within firms (Beneish &
Press, 1993; Ge & McVay, 2005). Ge and McVay (2005)
found large audit firms do a better job assessing
internal controls and adapting audit procedures due
to more experienced auditors. Vann and Presley
(2018) concluded that Big 4 auditors are better able
to detect and prevent earnings management.
Therefore, hypothesis 1b is:
H1b: Audit quality attenuates the tendency for
manufacturers with severe losses or is substantially
underperforming to report higher bad debt expense.
Jackson and Liu (2010) and McNichols and
Wilson (1988) have found that firms manage earnings
through the allowance for doubtful accounts and bad
debts. While Jackson and Liu (2010) compared
analysts’ earnings projections, they attempted to
model based on the highest performing and lowest
performing and found no statistical significance
in how far the firms were from estimates. Firms
attempt to have zero earnings surprises between
analysts’ projections and actual – or meeting
the projection
(Burgstahler
&
Dichev,
1997;
Degeorge et al., 1999; Neifar, Halioui, & Ben
Abdelaziz, 2016). Exceeding analysts’ projections, or
what has been described as positive, results in
the highest upward reaction by the markets
(Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznic & McNichols, 2002;
Neifar et al., 2016). A firm may manage earnings
to achieve a few cents improvement in earnings
per share, but more might be viewed as fraud rather
than earnings management. It appears that highquality audit firms do a better job of preventing
earnings management. Therefore, hypotheses two
and three are:
H2a: Chemical and allied products manufacturers
will manage earnings by reducing bad debt expense,
to even revenue-producing, when earnings per share
before bad debt expense is at or slightly higher than
analysts’ projections to obtain zero surprise or
positive surprise.

H2b: Audit quality attenuates the tendency for
manufacturers to manage earnings by reducing bad
debt expense, to even revenue-producing, when
earnings per share before bad debt expense is at or
slightly higher than analysts’ projections to obtain
zero surprise or positive surprise.
H3a: Chemical
and
allied
products
manufacturers will manage earnings by reducing
bad debt expense, to even revenue-producing, when
earnings per share before bad debt expense are
slightly lower than analysts’ projections to obtain
zero surprise.
H3b: Audit quality attenuates the tendency for
manufacturers to manage earnings by reducing
bad debt expense, to even revenue-producing, when
earnings per share before bad debt expense are
slightly lower than analysts’ projections to obtain
zero surprise.

3. METHODOLOGY
The following variables were utilized in linear
regression models. All continuously measured
variables were winsorized to remove the impact of
outliers at the 1 and 99 levels. The potential
for the effect of within-firm correlation and
heteroscedasticity was mitigated using clustered
robust standard error clustering on gvkeynum.
Utilizing Stata, the firm ID (gvkey) variable was
destrung into a numerical variable – gvkeynum.
BOT_DECit represents firms i in the bottom
decile of performance for period t. These are firms
that could utilize a big bath to manipulate earnings.
Prior studies document that large audit firms
with greater resources and reputation perform
higher audits. AUDIT will be used to indicate audit
firm size is included. AUDIT coded 1 for the audit
firm being one of the “Big 4” or 0 otherwise.
Consistent with findings by Bartov et al. (2002),
EPS_CLOSE_OVER, and EPSBELOW look to identify
firms that are close to either meeting or beating
analysts’ forecasts because doing so is rewarded
in the markets. Since they are close to meeting
analysts’ projections or they are very close to
exceeding analysts’ projections, firms may manage
earnings.
EPS_CLOSE_OVER is coded 1 for firms that have
pre-bad debt expense earnings per share that was no
more than three percent above analysts’ forecast
and 0 otherwise. Bad debt expense is expected to be
lower.
EPSBELOW is coded 1 for firms that have
pre-bad debt expense earnings per share that was no
more than three percent below analysts’ forecast
and 0 otherwise. Bad debt expense is expected to be
lower, so the firms can meet expectations.
Large firms with more sophisticated financial
reporting and internal controls should produce
higher
financial
reporting
quality.
Hence
the tendency to manage earnings should be less for
large companies. We control for this result by
including the variable, LogASSETS defined as the log
of total firm assets.
Highly levered companies with greater financial
risk have incentives that include contractual
obligations related to fixed debt costs as well as
the potential avoidance of debt covenant violations
to manage earnings. To control for these effects we
include LEV and measure it as total long-term debt
divided by total assets.
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CASHFLOW/ASSETS is the firm’s net cash flow
from operations divided by total assets. Highly
liquid firms may have fewer incentives to manage
earnings through bad debts expense.
Prior studies document that managers of high
price-earnings (PE) growth firms use accruals to
manage earnings higher. Hence highly valued high
PE firms with incentives to meet analysts’ predicted
earnings may be more likely to use bad debts
expense to manage earnings. We further include
the control, PE, and measure it as the company’s
price-earnings ratio for the prior period or lagged
one period. PEit-1 is the firm’s price-earnings ratio
lagged one period.
Also included is CURRENT, the firm’s
current ratio.
ALT is the firm’s Altman Z-score which is
a measure of a firm’s credit quality (Altman, 1968).
Prior literature, such as Bhagat and Bolton (2008)
and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond
(2009), have used Altman’s Z-score as a measure of
credit quality. Credit quality could impact the firm’s
decision to manipulate the allowance for bad debts.
It is measured as:

𝑍 = 1.2𝐴 × 1.4𝐵 × 3.3𝐶 × 0.6𝐷 × 0.99𝐸

E = Sales/Total assets [measures asset turnover].
The Altman’s (1968) Z-score is interpreted as:
Z > 2.99 – “Safe” zone;
1.81 < Z < 2.99 – “Grey” zone;
Z < 1.81 – “Distress” zone.
BANKRUPT is the total number of business
bankruptcies in the country (American Bankruptcy
Institute, 2019). Firms may have incentives to
change their bad debt expense based on
the business’ economic condition or the general
economic condition of the nation. Of interest is
the period of the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
Consistent with Stein and Wang (2016), downward
earnings management or a big bath is more likely
during the financial crisis and BANKRUPT is
a measure of financial uncertainty. It is included as
a possible alternative explanation for changes in bad
debt expense. The magnitude of a firm’s cash flow
may affect the need to manage earnings. More
specifically, companies with greater (less) cash flow
should have lower (greater) incentives to manage
earnings.
LogBANKRUPT represents the log of the number
of firms declaring bankruptcy during the year.

3.1. Models

(1)

H1a states that companies with severe losses or
poor performing firms will increase their bad debt
expense or take a “big bath”. H1b states that audit
quality attenuates the tendency for manufacturers
with
severe
losses
of
are
substantially
underperforming to report high bad debt expense.
Both were tested using the following regressions:

A = Working capital/Total assets [measures
the relative amount of liquid assets];
B = Retained earnings/Total assets [determines
cumulative profitability];
C = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total
assets [measures earnings away from the effects of
taxes and leverage];
D = Market value of equity/Book value of total
liabilities [incorporates the effects of a decline in
the market value of a company’s shares];

Model 1a. Regressing bad debt expense as a percentage of sales
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡

= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4

𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑖𝑡

+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +

𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(3)

Model 1b. Regressing the allowance for doubtful accounts as a percentage of accounts receivable
𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡

= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4

𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑖𝑡

+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +

𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Initially, H2a and H3a will be tested by looking
for significant changes in bad debt expense as
a percentage of sales and allowance for a doubtful
account as a percentage of accounts receivable for
an indication of manipulation.
Models for H2a, H2b, H3a, and H3b will focus
on variables of interest described above. H2a
postulates that firms’ with earnings before bad debt
expense that is slightly over analysts’ projections

(4)

will manage earnings by reducing bad debt expense.
H2b states that audit quality attenuates the tendency
for manufacturers to manage earnings by reducing
bad debt expense, to even revenue-producing, when
earnings per share before bad debt expense are at or
slightly higher than analysts’ projections to obtain
zero surprise or positive surprise.
Models proposed to test these hypotheses are
Models 2a and 2b.

Model 2a. Model of bad debt expense to sales
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡

= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +

𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
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Model 2b. Model of allowance for doubtful accounts as a percentage of accounts receivable
𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡

= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +

𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
H3a postulates that firms with earnings before
bad debt expense that is slightly under analysts’
projections will manage earnings by reducing bad
debt expense. H3b states that audit quality attenuates
the tendency for manufacturers to manage earnings
by reducing bad debt expense, to even revenue-

(6)

producing, when earnings per share before bad debt
expense are slightly lower than analysts’ projections
to obtain zero surprise.
Models proposed to test this hypothesis are
Models 3a and 3b.

Model 3a. Model of bad debt expense as a percentage of sales
𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡

= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +

𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(7)

Model 3b. Model of allowance for doubtful accounts as a percentage of accounts receivable
𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡

= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +

𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Traditionally, the allowance for doubtful
accounts has been viewed as unconditional
conservatism (Ruch & Taylor, 2015). However,
unconditional conservatism is based on information
known at the beginning of an asset’s life while
conditional conservatism is based on information
obtained future periods (Basu, 2005). Changes in
the methodology for determining bad debt expense
based on current conditions rather than consistently
applied processes would indicate that the allowance
for doubtful accounts is conditional conservatism.
The
dependent
variables
noted
above
BDEit/Salesit and ALLOWit/ARit are measures of
consistency in determining the allowance for doubtful
accounts. One methodology for determining
the allowance for doubtful accounts is as
a percentage of accounts receivable (Gordon et al.,
2016). Prior research has only considered the income
statement impact, bad debt as a percentage of sales
and not the balance sheet impact; therefore, it is
believed this research should measure the allowance
as a percentage of accounts receivable as a measure
of reasonableness and consistency in addition to bad
debt as a percentage of sales. Significant changes
in these ratios would indicate the allowance for
doubtful accounts is conditional conservatism.
If H1a, H2a, and H3a hold to be true, this is further
evidence that bad debt expense is conditional (as
opposed to unconditional) conservatism.

(8)

during the study period from 2005 (the period after
the Jackson & Liu, 2010, research) through 2017.
Analysts’ reports for the period were obtained from
Bloomberg for each firm.

3.3. Sample
The initial extraction from COMPUSTAT of firms
with the SIC of 28 from 2005 through 2017 with
accounts receivable balances and allowance for
doubtful accounts resulted in 285 firms and
4,128 total observations. As noted earlier, utilizing
Stata, the firm ID (gvkey) variable was destrung into
a numerical variable – gvkeynum. The resulting
companies were sorted by gvkeynum and fiscal year.
Included in these companies were foreign registered
firms that do not report a Schedule II (or equivalent)
for disclosures in changes of valuation accounts,
which were dropped for lack of data needed for
the study. Also dropped were all firms that did not
have an allowance for doubtful accounts. Finally,
the EDGAR database was searched and Forms 10K
were reviewed for bad debt expense (BDE) and net
write-offs (WO) for each firm-year. Those firms that
did not disclose these changes in their allowance for
doubtful accounts, typically citing immateriality,
were
also
dropped.
The
resulting
sample
was 88 total firms representing 795 firm years.
Of the 88 firms, 30 had data for the entire period
from 2005 through 2017.
The manual entries of BDE and WO were
reviewed to reduce researcher error by a research
assistant reading the amounts back to the researcher
for confirmation with the 10K. Subsequent
verification
of
amounts
by
starting
with
the beginning of the year allowance for doubtful
accounts adding bad debt expense and then
subtracting net recoveries, as has been referenced in
earlier research (Jackson & Liu, 2010), is impossible
because virtually 100 percent of the companies have
other activity in the allowance for doubtful accounts,
such as acquisitions, divestitures, and most
commonly, foreign currency changes. In addition,

3.2. Data
In gathering the data, this study obtained total
accounts receivable, the total allowance for
uncollectible accounts, total assets, and other
firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT database
of North American firms for companies with
the standardized industry code (SIC) of 28 which
represents
chemical
and
allied
products
manufacturers. Bad debt expense and write-offs are
not reported by COMPUSTAT, so they were obtained
from the firms’ forms 10K Schedule II filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
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prior research has indicated the use of gross writeoffs and gross recoveries in modeling (Jackson &
Liu, 2010). Again, this was not possible. Substantially

all companies reported net write-offs or recoveries.
Table 1 presents the summary descriptive statistics
for the sample companies.

Table 1. Summary statistics for the sample
Total observations: 795

Mean

Standard deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Total assets (millions)
Sales (millions)
Market value (millions)
Accounts receivable to total assets
Accounts receivable to current assets
Bad debt expense to net income
Write-offs to net income

9,356
6,234
13,949
0.91%
2.36%
1.10%
1.18%

18,395
10,532
28,557
2.0%
4.9%
165.2%
173.0%

38
5
0
0.0%
0.0%
4345.5%
4436.4%

192,164
71,312
258,341
13.9%
34.5%
1009.1%
1100.0%

that audit quality attenuates the tendency for
manufacturers with severe losses of are substantially
underperforming to report high bad debt expense.
Both H1a and H1b were tested using Model 1a and
Model 1b (see equations (3), (4)).

4. RESULTS
H1a states that companies with severe losses or
significantly underperforming will increase their bad
debt expense or take a “big bath”. H3b states

Table 2. Summary statistics for independent variables (Model 1a and 1b)
Independent variable
BOT_DEC
logAssets
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
AUDIT
AUDIT*BOT_DEC

Mean
0.0866
8.070
0.293
0.096
13.819
2.325
3.936
10.548
0.930
0.048

Standard deviation
0.2814
1.530
0.232
0.067
48.029
1.4320
3.649
0.327
0.256
0.213

The following Pearson correlation matrix in
Table 3 indicates that the Altman Z-score is
correlated with both leverage and the current ratio.
This is expected since all measure the financial

Minimum
3.640
(0.203)
(317.000)
0.682
0.272
10.091
-

Maximum
1.0000
11.778
1.386
0.392
149.167
9.406
22.510
11.016
1.000
1.000

condition of a firm. In addition, AUDIT*BOT_DEC
and BOT_DEC are also correlated as is expected and
part of the hypothesis.

Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix for Models 1a and 1b
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Variables
BOT_DEC
logAssets
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
AUDIT
AUDIT*BOT_DEC

1
1.000
0.179
0.042
-0.352
0.043
-0.040
-0.103
-0.041
-0.165
0.8777

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.000
0.346
0.078
-0.010
-0.268
-0.275
-0.154
0.376
-0.048

1.000
-0.233
-0.074
-0.324
-0.537
-0.327
0.327
0.1162

1.000
0.060
0.122
0.491
0.129
0.177
-0.262

1.000
0.031
0.060
0.074
0.011
0.0686

1.000
0.548
0.115
-0.361
-0.045

1.000
0.094
-0.058
-0.068

1.000
-0.045
-0.035

1.000
0.0755

10

1.000

The regressions produced the following results:
Table 4. Regression results for Model 1a: Dependent variable – Bad Debt Expense to Sales
(Observations: 491)
Constant
BOT_DEC
logAssets
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
AUDIT
AUDIT*BOT_DEC
R2
F
Prob > F

Pred. sign
?
+
+
+
+
0.4218
15.500
0.0000

Coefficient
0.0102
0.0875
-0.0013
0.0055
-0.0143
0.0000
0.0015
0.0013
-0.0009
-0.0018
-0.0880

Robust
Std. err.
0.0302
0.1282
0.0010
0.0057
0.0143
0.0000
0.0012
0.0007
0.0024
0.0074
0.0125
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t-stat

p-value

0.56
6.82
-1.25
0.97
-1.00
-0.99
1.27
1.85
-0.37
-0.24
-7.06

0.574
0.000
0.216
0.334
0.323
0.324
0.209
0.069
0.716
0.811
0.000

95%
Confidence interval
0.0431
0.0771
0.6193
0.1130
-0.0033
0.0008
-0.0058
0.0167
-0.4282
0.0143
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0009
0.0038
-0.001
0.0027
-0.0056
0.0038
-0.0165
0.0130
-0.1129
-0.0632
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These results show that the worst performing
firms tend to increase their bad debt expense;
however, this is mitigated by quality audit firms.
With p-values of zero, the results have a 99 percent
confidence level. Prior studies have researched bad
debt expense as a percentage of sales. Model 1b
expands this prior research to analyze the allowance
for doubtful accounts as a percentage of accounts
receivable shown in Table 5.
These results provide support for H1a and
H1b. The estimates for our BOT_DECit and
AUDIT*BOT_DECit interaction term are significantly
positive and negative respectively. Companies that
are unable or unwilling to avoid large losses will
report higher bad debt expense, but high-quality
auditors attenuate this positive relation. With
p-values of 0.002, the results have a 95 percent
confidence level.

H2a and H3a posit that firms with earnings per
share close to analysts’ projected earnings per share
will utilize bad debt expense to manipulate earnings
per share to either meet or beat the analysts’
projections following the financial crisis of 20072008. Analysts’ projections were obtained through
the Bloomberg Terminal. The analysts represented
a variety of sources and not just one analyst for
the entire sample of companies. Analyst projections
were obtained for 458 of the 543 firm years from
2009 through 2017, mostly due to analysts not
following particular stocks.
In addition to modeling attempts, we reviewed
companies reporting negative, or income-producing,
bad debt expense. These were compared to those
companies reporting negative bad debt expense
with either a near miss (over or under) analysts’
projections. Table 6 illustrates those findings.

Table 5. Regression results Model 1b: Dependent variable – Allowance as Percentage of Accounts Receivable
(Observations: 491)
Constant
BOT_DEC
logAssets
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
AUDIT
AUDIT*BOT_DEC
R2
F
Prob > F

Pred. sign
?
+
+
+
+
0.5256
10.290
0.0000

Coefficient
0.2362
0.5353
-0.0150
-0.0136
0.1318
-0.0001
-0.0048
-0.0001
-0.0009
-0.0661
-0.5244

Robust
Std. err.
0.2101
0.1683
0.0068
0.0407
0.0970
0.0689
0.0082
0.0038
0.0156
0.0568
0.1656

t-stat

p-value

1.12
3.18
-2.21
-0.33
1.36
-1.32
-0.58
-0.03
-0.06
-1.16
-3.17

0.264
0.002
0.030
0.740
0.178
0.190
0.562
0.974
0.954
0.248
0.002

95%
Confidence Interval
-0.1822
0.6545
0.2003
0.8704
-0.2857
-0.0015
-0.0945
0.0674
-0.0612
0.3248
-0.0002
0.0000
-0.2110
0.1156
-0.0076
0.0074
-0.0319
0.0301
-0.1791
0.0470
-0.8541
-0.1948

Table 6. Near miss companies and negative bad debt expense
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Total

Negative bad debt expense
(Companies reporting)
Number
Percentage
5
7.69%
8
12.50%
8
13.56%
2
3.08%
6
9.68%
7
11.11%
0
0.00%
3
5.66%
39

Near miss before BDE
Under
1
6
3
5
2
4
2
5
28

Of the 39 companies reporting negative bad
debt expense during the study period, only six
(15.4%) also had near misses from analysts’
projections. Six companies reported both near
misses and negative bad debt expense. Each of those

Near miss & neg. BDE

Over
2
3
0
4
2
3
3
3
20

0
2
0
0
1
3
0
0
6

six companies also had near misses under analysts’
projections or 21.4% of the near misses under.
Statistics related to the variables from Model 2a
and Model 2b (see equations (5) and (6)) are
as follows:

Table 7. Summary statistics for independent variables (Model 2a and 2b)
Independent variable
EPS_CLOSE_OVER
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPS_CLOSE_OVER*AUDIT
AUDIT

Mean
0.062
8.167
0.256
0.103
12.356
2.429
3.819
10.550
0.059
0.927

Standard deviation
0.240
1.616
0.162
0.065
49.268
1.478
3.426
0.330
0.236
0.261

182

Minimum
3.640
(0.203)
(317.000)
0.682
0.272
10.091
-

Maximum
1.000
11.778
0.830
0.392
149.167
9.406
22.510
11.016
1.000
1.000

Expected sign
+
+
+
+
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The following Pearson correlation matrix
for
these
variables
indicates
AUDIT
and
EPS_CLOSE_OVER are highly correlated. This is
consistent with the expectation that high-quality
auditors have an impact on unreasonable accruals

such as modifications to bad debt expense. Also,
the ALT is correlated with both LEV and CURRENT.
Again, this is expected because all are measures of
a firm’s financial stability.

Table 8. Pearson correlation matrix for Model 2a and 2b: Independent variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Variables
EPS_CLOSE_OVER
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPS_CLOSE_OVER*AUDIT
AUDIT

1
1.000
0.033
-0.027
0.157
0.033
0.004
0.091
-0.044
0.039
0.982

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
0.346
0.078
0.034
-0.268
-0.275
-0.154
0.376
0.042

1.000
-0.233
-0.079
-0.324
-0.537
-0.327
0.327
0.020

1.000
0.088
0.122
0.191
0.129
0.177
0.164

1.000
0.012
0.090
0.052
0.072
0.031

1.000
0.548
0.115
-0.361
-0.003

1.000
0.094
-0.058
0.094

1.000
-0.045
-0.033

1.000
0.071

1.000

The regression of bad debt expense to sales

with Model 2a produced the following results:

Table 9. Model 2a regression results: Dependent variable – Bad Debt Expense to Sales
(Observations: 491)
Constant
EPS_CLOSE_OVER
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPS_CLOSE_OVER*AUDIT
AUDIT
R2

Pred. sign

Coefficient

t-statistic

p-value

?
+
+
+
+

0.071055
-0.031667
-0.022941
0.003268
-0.036182
-0.000008
-0.000139
0.001327
-0.002430
0.030340
-0.024156

1.14
-2.28
-1.94
0.38
-2.12
-0.54
-0.09
1.45
-0.5
2.15
-1.82

0.026
0.026
0.055
0.704
0.037
0.591
0.925
0.151
0.618
0.034
0.073

0.2151

While the explanatory power is not high,
companies that are close to analysts’ projections and
only slightly over tend to lower their bad debt
expense, and the result is statistically significant.
However, that tendency is mitigated by quality audit
firms which is again statistically significant. With
p-values of less than 0.05, the results have
a 95 percent confidence level.

The same variables were utilized to regress
the allowance for doubtful accounts as a percentage
of accounts receivable or Model 2b. Since the ratio is
also used as a calculation for bad debt expense and
others have not studied it, the results add additional
robustness.

Table 10. Model 2b regression results: Dependent variable – Allowance as % of Accounts Receivable
(Observations: 491)
Constant
EPS_CLOSE_OVER
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPS_CLOSE_OVER*AUDIT
AUDIT
R2

Pred. sign

Coefficient

t-statistic

p-value

?
+
+
+
+

0.573044
-0.246515
-0.021464
-0.025113
-0.020020
-0.000054
-0.014853
0.000094
-0.010773
0.239293
-0.202975

1.31
-2.69
-2.83
-0.4
-0.13
-0.63
-1.15
0.02
-0.31
2.59
-2.19

0.193
0.009
0.006
0.689
0.896
0.533
0.253
0.986
0.759
0.011
0.032

0.3058

The regression also identified that when
companies are just slightly over analysts’
projections the allowance account as a percentage of
accounts receivable is lower at a 95 percent
significant level. As was the case with the previous
regression, this tendency is mitigated by high-quality
audit firms again with p-values of less than 0.05,
the results are significant at the 95 percent level.

Companies that were only slightly under
analysts’ projections were used to produce
regression of bad debt expense to sales and
regression of the allowance for doubtful accounts to
accounts receivable to test H3a and H3b using
Models 3a and 3b.
Statistics related to the variables (see
equations (7) and (8)) are as follows:
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Table 11. Summary statistics for independent variables (Model 3a and 3b)
Independent variable
EPSBELOW
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPSBELOW*AUDIT
AUDIT

Mean
0.041
8.167
0.256
0.103
12.356
2.429
3.819
10.550
0.039
0.927

Standard deviation
0.198
1.616
0.162
0.065
49.268
1.478
3.426
0.330
0.193
0.261

Minimum
3.640
(0.203)
(317.000)
0.682
0.272
10.091
-

Maximum
1.000
11.778
0.830
0.392
149.167
9.406
22.510
11.016
1.000
1.000

Expected sign
+
+
+
+

Table 12. Model 3a and 3b: Independent variable – Pearson correlation matrix
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Variable
EPSBELOW
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPSBELOW*AUDIT
AUDIT

1
1.000
0.031
0.029
0.097
0.038
0.023
0.023
-0.053
0.974
0.018

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.000
0.346
0.078
0.034
-0.268
-0.275
-0.154
0.042
0.376

1.000
-0.233
-0.079
-0.324
-0.537
-0.327
0.041
0.020

1.000
0.088
0.122
0.191
0.129
0.103
0.164

1.000
0.012
0.090
0.052
-0.041
0.031

1.000
0.548
0.115
-0.030
-0.003

1.000
0.094
0.024
0.094

1.000
0.040
-0.033

1.000
0.071

1.000

Correlations
are
virtually
identical
to
the previous matrix. The following table reports

the results of the regression of bad debt expense to
sales, Model 3a.

Table 13. Model 3a regression results: Dependent variable – Bad Debt Expense to Sales
(Observations: 491)
Constant
EPS_CLOSE_OVER
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPS_CLOSE_OVER*AUDIT
AUDIT
R2

Pred. sign

Coefficient

t-statistic

p-value

?
+
+
+
+

0.071055
-0.031667
-0.022941
0.003268
-0.036182
-0.000008
-0.000139
0.001327
-0.002430
0.030340
-0.024156

1.14
-2.28
-1.94
0.38
-2.12
-0.54
-0.09
1.45
-0.5
2.15
-1.82

0.026
0.026
0.055
0.704
0.037
0.591
0.925
0.151
0.618
0.034
0.073

0.2151

The regression of bad debt expense to sales
utilizing these independent variables produced
statistically significant results. Firm’s with earnings
slightly below analysts’ forecasts were likely to lower
their bad debt expense, which was statistically

significant. This tendency to lower bad debt expense
was offset by high-quality audit firms.
Model 3b modeling the allowance for doubtful
accounts as a percentage of accounts receivable
produced the following regression.

Table 14. Model 3b regression results: Dependent variable – Allowance for Doubtful Accounts as % of
Accounts Receivable
(Observations: 491)

Pred. sign

Coefficient

t-statistic

p-value

Constant
EPSBELOW
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPSBELOW*AUDIT
AUDIT
R2

?
+
+
+
+

0.57429
(0.25197)
(0.02146)
(0.25500)
(0.02249)
(0.00006)
(0.01498)
0.00013
(0.01083)
0.24768
(0.20344)

1.32
(2.70)
(2.83)
(0.41)
(0.15)
(0.65)
(1.16)
0.02
(0.03)
2.67
(2.19)

0.192
0.008
0.006
0.684
0.882
0.520
0.249
0.981
0.758
0.009
0.031

0.306

Consistent with firms that were only slightly
over analysts’ projections, firms slightly under
analysts’ projections resulted in a coefficient of
negative 0.25197 and with p-values of less than 0.05

are statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
This negative tendency was again significantly
attenuated by high-quality audit firms also
statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
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The market fluctuations during the study
period mirror the fluctuations in BDEit/Salesit and
ALLOWit/ARit which provides further evidence that
companies react to conditions in the environment
when recording bad debt expense.
Robustness
An estimation of bad debt expense (estBDE) as
a percent of sales for each year was calculated using
the following:

𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝛽1 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 +
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡

calculations of estimated bad debt as a percentage
of sales for each year, abnormal bad debt as
a percentage of sales (ABNBDE) was calculated using
actual bad debt as a percentage of sales less
estimated bad debt as a percentage of sales.
A regression model was run again using ABNBDE as
the dependent variable rather than BDEit/Salesit and
ALLOWit/ARit.
H1a and H1b were further tested using three
additional models for robustness.
Abnormal bad debt was also regressed using
the same independent variables that were used
for the testing of bad debt expense to sales and
the allowance for doubtful accounts to accounts
receivable as follows for Model 1R1:

(9)

Upon obtaining the coefficients for each year,
estimated bad debt as a percentage of sales was
calculated for each year. Following those annual

Model 1R1. Regression results using Abnormal Bad Debt as dependent variable

𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐵𝐷𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4

𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑖𝑡

+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +

𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(10)

The regression produced the following results:
Table 15. Regression results of Abnormal Bad Debt Expense (Model 1R1)
(Observations: 491)

Pred. sign

Coefficient

t-stat

p-value

Constant
BOT_DEC
logAssets
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
AUDIT
AUDIT*BOT_DEC
R2
F
Prob > F

?
+
+
+
+
-

0.0142
0.0707
-0.0013
0.0052
-0.0012
0.0000
0.0087
0.0015
-0.0015
0.0019
-0.0702

0.45
5.21
-1.45
0.91
-0.08
-1.09
0.75
2.20
-0.57
0.25
-5.28

0.652
0.000
0.150
0.366
0.937
0.279
0.455
0.030
0.572
0.801
0.000

0.3209
22.670
0.0000

These results are also consistent with the initial
regressions. Underperforming firms increase bad
debt expense; however, audit quality attenuates this
tendency with both independent variables having
p-values of zero are at the 99 percent confidence level.
An estimation of the allowance for doubtful
accounts (estALLOW) as a percentage of accounts
receivable for each year was calculated using
the following:

𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝛽1 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 +
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡

Upon obtaining the coefficients for each year,
the estimated allowance for doubtful accounts as
a percentage of accounts receivable was calculated
for each year. Following those annual calculations of
estimated allowance for doubtful accounts as
a percentage of accounts receivable for each year,
abnormal allowance for doubtful accounts as
a percentage of accounts receivable (ABNALLOW)
was calculated using actual bad debt as a percentage
of sales less estimated bad debt as a percentage of
sales. A regression Model 1R2 was run again using
ABNALLOW as the dependent variable.

(11)

Model 1R2. Regression results using Abnormal Allowances as dependent variable

𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4

𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑖𝑡

+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +

𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
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The regression results of abnormal allowance

for doubtful accounts produced the following:

Table 16. Regression results of Abnormal Allowance for Doubtful Accounts (Model 1R2)
(Observations: 491)

Pred. sign

Coefficient

t-stat

p-value

Constant
BOT_DEC
logAssets
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
AUDIT
AUDIT*BOT_DEC
R2
F
Prob > F

?
+
+
+
+
-

0.3054
0.4582
-0.0149
0.0142
0.1943
-0.0001
-0.0068
0.0008
-0.0137
-0.0511
-0.4392

1.31
2.73
-2.39
-0.33
1.75
-1.28
-0.87
0.21
-0.74
-0.96
-2.65

0.193
0.008
0.019
0.742
0.083
0.203
0.385
0.837
0.461
0.339
0.010

0.4279
10.180
0.0000

Once again, these results are consistent with
the initial regressions. Underperforming firms
increase bad debt expense (higher allowance for
doubtful accounts); however, audit quality attenuates
this tendency with both independent variables having
p-values of less than 0.05 are statistically significant
at the 95 percent confidence level.

H2a and H2b are also further tested by
regressing abnormal bad debt and abnormal
allowance as described above.
Model 2R1 using abnormal bad debt as
the dependent variable is as follows:

Model 2R1. Regression results using Abnormal Allowances as dependent variable

𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐵𝐷𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(13)

The results of the regressions produced the following results:
Table 17. Model 2R1 regression results: Dependent variable – Abnormal Bad Debt
(Observations: 491)

Coefficient

t-statistic

p-value

Constant
EPS_CLOSE_OVER
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPS_CLOSE_OVER*AUDIT
AUDIT
R2

0.057988
-0.027056
-0.002120
0.003605
-0.020220
-0.000012
-0.000454
0.001537
-0.002713
0.231049
-0.016113

0.99
-2.55
-2.15
0.44
-1.28
-0.77
-0.30
1.79
-0.58
2.42
-1.60

0.325
0.013
0.034
0.658
0.206
0.442
0.762
0.077
0.565
0.018
0.113

0.1662

The variables of interest are significant. Firms
just over analysts’ projections decrease bad debt
expense. Again, this is mitigated by quality auditors.

Both variables have p-values less than 0.05 and are
significant at the 95 percent level.
Model 2R2 using abnormal allowance as
the dependent variable is as follows:

Model 2R2. Regression results using Abnormal Allowances as dependent variable

𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
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Table 18. Model 2R2 regression results: Dependent variable – Abnormal Allowance
(Observations: 491)

Coefficient

t-statistic

p-value

Constant
EPS_CLOSE_OVER
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPS_CLOSE_OVER*AUDIT
AUDIT
R2

0.593387
-0.217381
-0.020562
-0.022560
0.051408
-0.000075
-0.155183
0.001029
-0.022010
0.212850
-0.167402

1.42
-2.88
-3.01
-0.04
0.33
-0.79
-1.26
0.2
-0.63
2.80
-2.15

0.158
0.005
0.003
0.719
0.740
0.432
0.211
0.840
0.528
0.006
0.034

0.2504

The results of this regression are also
consistent with prior models. Underperforming
firms increase bad debt expense (higher allowance
for doubtful accounts); however, audit quality
attenuates this tendency with both independent
variables having p-values of less than 0.05 are
significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

H3a states that firms with net income before
bad debt expense that is just under analysts’
projections modify bad debt expense to meet
expectations. H3b states that this tendency is
attenuated by high-quality audits. H3a and H3b are
also further tested using abnormal bad debt expense
and abnormal allowance as dependent variables.

Model 3R1. Using abnormal bad debt as the dependent variable

𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐵𝐷𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(15)

Table 19. Model 3R1 regression results: Dependent variable – Abnormal Bad Debt Expense
(Observations: 491)

Coefficient

t-statistic

p-value

Constant
EPSBELOW
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPSBELOW*AUDIT
AUDIT
R2

0.057829
-0.024388
-0.002118
0.003663
-0.020203
-0.000012
-0.004694
0.001543
-0.002702
0.022643
-0.016061

0.98
-2.29
-2.15
0.45
-1.27
-0.87
-0.31
1.81
-0.57
2.1
-1.59

0.328
0.025
0.034
0.654
0.207
0.423
0.754
0.075
0.568
0.039
0.115

0.1662

This regression shows those firms with net
income before bad debt expense that is just under
analysts’ projections are a significant factor in
creating abnormal bad debt expense – lower bad

debt expense. This tendency is attenuated by quality
audit firms. Both independent variables have
p-values of less than 0.05 are significant at
a 95 percent confidence level.

Model 3R2. Using Abnormal Allowance as the dependent variable

𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
The regression produced the following results:
Table 20. Model 3R2 regression results: Dependent variable – Abnormal Allowance
(Observations: 491)

Coefficient

t-statistic

p-value

Constant
EPSBELOW
logASSETS
LEV
CASHFLOW/ASSETS
Lagged PE
CURRENT
ALT
logBANKRUPT
EPSBELOW*AUDIT
AUDIT
R2

0.596567
-0.232600
-0.020549
-0.023012
0.050273
-0.000076
-0.156419
0.001063
-0.222317
0.229152
-0.168074

1.43
-3.04
-3.01
-0.37
0.33
-0.80
-1.27
0.21
-0.64
3.01
-2.14

0.156
0.003
0.003
0.713
0.743
0.426
0.070
0.835
0.524
0.004
0.033

0.2513
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As was the case with Model 3R1, this regression
also shows that those firms with net income before
bad debt expense that is just under analysts’
projections are a significant factor in creating
abnormal bad debt expense – lower bad debt
expense. This tendency is attenuated by quality
audit firms. Both independent variables have
p-values of less than 0.05 and significant at
a 95 percent confidence level. All the above are
consistent with earlier findings.
In addition to the above alternative models,
the study included both measures of bad debt
expense as a percentage of the sale and the allowance
for doubtful accounts as a percentage of accounts
receivable.

quality audits attenuate the tendency for firms in
these circumstances to understate bad debt expense.
The results of Models 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b
provide significant results. These results were
confirmed via robustness testing of Models 2R1,
2R2, 3R1, and 3R2 where abnormal bad debt and
abnormal allowance were regressed. Companies
whose net income before bad debt expense that was
either slightly over or slightly under analysts’
projections reduced their bad debt expense. H2b and
H3b state that high-quality audits reduce
the tendency for forms described above to reduce
their bad debt expense to meet or beat analysts’
projection. Companies that are close to meeting or
beating analysts’ projections will, relative to other
firms, report lower bad debt expense, but high-quality
auditors attenuate this negative relation. Therefore,
the null hypotheses for H2b and H3b are rejected.
The data only looked at companies in
the chemical and allied products manufacturing
industry; therefore, the results may not hold true
for other industries. Only a small percentage of
companies met the thresholds for earnings
manipulation. With such a small sample, even if
misses had been significant, conclusions of earnings
manipulation would be difficult to generalize. Also,
models had low R2 results due to the small
percentage of companies meeting the criteria.
Since the study is in only one industry,
additional research into other industries should be
completed to determine to what extent results can
be generalized. Other valuation accounts, such as
those for inventory and taxes, are also required by
generally accepted accounting principles. These
accounts could be subject to manipulation by
management and are worthy of study. As is the case
with the allowance for doubtful accounts, both
the inventory reserve account and the income tax
valuation account require disclosure of activity in
Schedule II. Inventory valuation reserves would
change in a manner like the allowance for doubtful
accounts. The current period’s reserve should be
realized as losses in the next period. Therefore,
the methodology utilized in this study could be
modified to test inventory valuations in companies
with significant inventories.

5. CONCLUSION
H1a states that companies with severe losses or
severely underperforming will increase their bad
debt expense or take a “big bath” to build
an excessive allowance for doubtful accounts.
In testing this, the poorest performing firms, those
whose net income to assets, were in the bottom
decile of the sample (BOT_DEC) were the variable of
interest. The null hypothesis is rejected. Poorest
performing firms increase their bad debt expense.
H1b states that high-quality audits attenuate
the tendency for firms with severe losses or
substantially underperforming to report high bad
debt expense. This null hypothesis is also rejected.
High quality auditors attenuate the tendency for
underperforming firms to increase bad debt
expense.
Stated simply, H2 and H3 provide an answer to
why companies have overstated their allowance
for doubtful accounts as Bryan et al. (2021) have
reported. We postulated that companies would
utilize their excess reserves created through either
cookie jar reserves (excessive conservatism applied
over time) or a big bath charge (making the allowance
even larger during the crisis) (Watts, 2003b), by
reversing them when earnings are slightly below
analysts’ expectations (H2a) to create zero surprise
or when earnings before bad debt expense are
slightly above analysts’ projections to create positive
surprise. In addition, H2b and H2b state that high-
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